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After five years of unprecedented growth in military spending, the
defense policy of the United States has come to a dangerous cross-
roads. At the start of the decade, defense budget questions were
debated almost exclusively in terms of threats to American security,
but by 1986 fiscal issues dominated the defense debate. Most im-
portant, the built-in pressures for continued increases in defense
spending of the Reagan Administration's first five defense budgets
now clash directly with severe federal spending constraints. This
escalating tension forces the Administration and Congress to con-
front basic questions about the relationship between defense policy
and defense resources.
This article describes the origins of the dilemma Congress and
the Department of Defense (DoD) now face and examines the im-
pact the spending trends of the early 1980s will have on the defense
budgets of the coming years. In the future, sound budget manage-
ment and planning by DoD will hinge upon a clear understanding of
the fiscal track followed since 1981. Security choices now must be
made within this fiscal context.
The driving force behind the early '80s defense policy and budget
decisions was the incoming Reagan Administration's perception of a
grave threat to the nation's security. In the eyes of the new Penta-
gon leadership, U.S. security declined in the 1970s as a result of
financial neglect, while during this same period Soviet defense capa-
bilities grew because of dramatic increases in Soviet military spend-
ing.' This perspective proved persuasive to the public and to
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1970s. 10 INT'I. SECt;Rrrv 27 (1985). Cf. Laird, A Strong Stan in a Difficul Decade: Defense
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Congress, which provided nearly all the defense funds requested by
the Administration between 1981 and 1985.2 As a result, budget
authority for national defense more than doubled from fiscal year
(FY) 1980 (the last full budget year of the Carter Administration)
through FY 1986. This increase in authority brought actual defense
spending (outlays) in FY 1986 to a higher level, adjusted for infla-
tion, than in any peacetime year since the end of World War II.
The composition of this unprecedented buildup - the way in
which the money was allocated and the failure to set priorities
among weapons programs - helped to create DoD's current fiscal
bind. Since FY 1981, the defense budget has been increasingly
driven by commitments to research, procurement and military con-
struction, the "investment" part of defense spending. The invest-
ment share of defense budget authority has risen from 38 percent in
FY 1980 to 48 percent in FY 1986. The dramatic growth in invest-
ment spending has resulted in a large accumulation of unspent
funds and a rising share of future defense outlays obligated to weap-
ons contracts. In the next few years, increasing weapons costs,
Policy in the Ni:on-Ford Years, 10 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1985) (reassessment and strengthening
process of the national defense during the Nixon-Ford years); Komer, Wlhat Decade of
Neglect?, 10 INT'L SECURITY 70 (1985) (analysis of factors other than neglect which caused
the shift in the overall U.S.-USSR military balance). The Defense Department rein-
forced this impression with a succession of glossy, apparently richly documented reports
on the Soviet buildup, urging the United States and its allies to meet the Soviet chal-
lenge. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER (1981); U.S. DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER (1983); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY
POWER (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER (1985).
2. In April of 1981, 41% of those polled thought the Soviets were stronger than the
U.S., 36% thought the two superpowers were "about equal" and only 18% thought the
U.S. was stronger. ABC/Washington Post, Survey No. 209 (Nov. 13, 1985). By 1981,
51% of those polled felt that the U.S. was spending too little on national defense, 22%
that spending was about right, and only 15% that the U.S. spent too much on defense.
The Gallup Poll, Survey No. 249-G (Mar. 1985).
For data on congressional support for the Reagan Administration's budget request,
see A. MARONI, DEFENSE SPENDING: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY QUESTIONS 6 (Congres-
sional Research Service Report, Aug. 1985 update) [hereinafter MARONI, CRS STUDY].
3. For the purposes of this article, "budget authority" and "appropriations" are
used interchangeably. "Budget authority" means funds appropriated by Congress in a
given fiscal year, some of which will be spent in that year but some of which may con-
tinue to be spent over a number of years. "Outlays" are the actual spending which will
occur in a given year. Some programs, primarily weapons, will take several years to
complete; not all of the appropriations will be spent in the first year for which they' were
provided. Outlays thus lag behind budget authority. In any given year. outlays grow out
of both the new funds appropriated for that year and out of past appropriations for
weapons programs that are still being completed.
"National Defense" is generally used in this article to cover Function 050, the national
defense function in the federal budget. Function 050 includes not only the Defense
Department budget, but also nuclear weapons funds for the Department of Energy, and
funds for the civil defense parts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Selective Service, and the nation's strategic stockpiles.
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mounting demands for skilled personnel and for operations and
maintenance support for new sophisticated programs, and produc-
tion commitments to new hardware currently in research and devel-
opment will generate further upward pressures on future defense
budgets.
Just when DoD is facing pressures to increase spending, budget-
ary constraints are limiting available funds. When Congress consid-
ers the Defense Department's budget request, threats to U.S.
security are no longer the overwhelming concern. Instead, wasteful
and uncontrollable defense spending and unprecedented budgetary
deficits combine to make defense a "resource" issue, and these will
dominate the defense debate unless budget planners begin to make
choices among programs.
The present severe constraints on overall federal spending are
forcing both the Administration and Congress to find new ways to
restrain future budget growth. Defense has not been spared in the
search to reduce the federal spending deficit. Initial congressional
appropriations for defense in FY 1986 were frozen at FY 1985
levels. Following implementation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Deficit Reduction Act, defense budget authority for FY 1986 de-
clined nearly 6 percent (after inflation) below FY 1985 levels, the
first actual reduction in defense funds since the beginning of the
defense buildup under President Jimmy Carter.4 This downward
4. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1037 covered defense spending in
some detail. The act provided that 50% of the cuts required to meet a specific deficit
reduction target would have to come from defense outlays. Given the slow spendout
rate for some defense programs (primarily weapons systems), this means the Defense
Department would have to cut budget authority in amounts that would provide the nec-
essary results in outlays for the fiscal year in question. Some defense outlays were given
special exemptions: DoD could elect to exclude outlays on weapons programs already
under contract, and, for 1986 alone, the President could choose to exempt some or all
spending on military personnel accounts from the cuts.
In addition, for 1986 alone, DoD was allowed to protect specific programs in its
budget, provided cuts were increased on other programs in that same account with the
result that the account as a whole took its share of required cuts. For example, in the
1986 cuts, the Department elected to protect the Strategic Defense Initiative from cuts.
As a result, all other programs in the "Defense Agencies RDT&E" [research develop-
ment, testing and evaluation] account were cut double the normal rate of 4.9% (or
nearly 10%) in order to reach Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets. To some extent this
protected new budget authority for some programs (again. primarily weapons pro-
grams) with large unobligated balances. See G. ADAMS &.1. COLMAN. (;RANII-R1TDMAN-
Hoi.I.INGS AND TIlE FY 1986 )EFENSE BUDGET (Defense Budget ProjectJan. 6, 1986): lor
the announced FY 1986 cuts tinder Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, see O.IB & CBO. Seques-
t'atiopi Report for Fiscal )ear 1986 - .4 Joitt Report to the Comptroller General of thr .S.. 51
Fed. Reg. 1919 (1986).
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trend continued in 1986, when Congress froze the FY 1987 defense
budget at the lower FY 1986 level.5
The Defense Department faces a real budgetary dilemma; the
Pentagon can no longer have it all. In FY 1987, Congress could
trim the defense budget around the edges. In the coming years,
however, such trimming will not be adequate. Both DoD and Con-
gress will be pressed to define security requirements more carefully,
so that those requirements can be met with more limited resources.
In order properly to address the fiscal crisis facing defense, DoD
and Congress clearly need to understand current fiscal trends, es-
tablish priority-setting mechanisms, adopt sound management prac-
tices, and fundamentally rethink the relationship between national
security needs and budgetary resources.
The balance between defense investment and consumption, and
between spending for personnel and maintenance, must be re-
stored. Not all new weapons systems should proceed to production;
choices between systems must be made while weapons are in the
research and development stage. Efficient management and ac-
counting practices must be established. Real spending data must be
disclosed so that problems can be identified and fixed before they
get out of control. Instead of simply taking an axe to the budget,
defense policy planners must respond by setting priorities, making
choices and managing soundly to ensure greater national security
within the context of dwindling defense resources.
I. The Fiscal Legacy of President Reagan's First Five Years
Since 1981, the United States has experienced one of the most
rapid expansions of defense spending in its history. From a fiscal
perspective, DoD's implementation of rapid growth in defense
spending has been short-sighted. The key problem lies in the com-
position of the military buildup. Since FY 1980, defense budgets
have focused heavily on investment programs: research and devel-
5. Although the Defense Department requested defense budget authority for FY
1987 of $320.3 billion, Congress provided $292.2 billion, an amount equivalent to FY
1986 appropriations, but actually constituting a slight budget reduction after the ellcots
of inflation are considered. 132 CONG. REC. H4,407-89 (daily ed. June 26, 1986). S'e also
(;anlcy, DoD Sulfers Shatpesl Budgel Cu Ever as Cotgress leadis Home fir Electins. ARMED
FORC:ES J. lNr'L. 14 (Nov. 1986). This amount is $4 billion below what a 3.5% inllation
rate would provide. There is some disagreement about ihe linal amount provided in ihe
budget resolution, since Congress also provided an additional $7 billion lor defense.
Revenue changes and domestic spending cils were enacted which would make such
Funds available. (),.tc:E oF- MANA(;EMENT NI) BUD;ET. I-SESSION RvIFAW OF T1-l:
1987 BUD;ET 9-14 (1986) I hereinafier OMB REtX:vEW.
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opment of new weapons, procurement of hardware, and military
construction. By mid-decade, this commitment to investment had
already created a significant and dangerous fiscal legacy: a large
backlog of appropriated but unspent funds, persistent findings of
excess funds in accounts where costs proved to be lower than antici-
pated, and the likelihood of high levels of uncontrollable future de-
fense outlays.
A. The Perceived Threat and the Budgetary Response
The new Administration's strong commitment to a major defense
buildup stemmed from the perception of an urgent need to com-
pensate for a "decade of neglect" of the nation's defenses. 6 By the
end of the 1970s, the defense debate was dominated by the argu-
ment that U.S. defenses had declined, that Soviet military strength
surpassed that of the United States, and that the USSR's military
superiority strengthened its influence around the globe. 7 Military
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua fur-
ther worried those who feared American weakness. The Carter Ad-
ministration had already responded to the situation by requesting
larger increases in the defense budget.8 The Reagan Administra-
6. There is some disagreement about the reality of this neglect. First, although de-
fense spending generally did decline in constant dollars from FY 1970 through FY 1979,
DEFENSE BUDGET PROJECT, DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE 1980's: ANALYTICAL TABLES AND
GRAPHICS, at Table III (Mar. 31, 1986) [hereinafter DBP ANALYrICAL TABLES] this re-
flected the withdrawal of the U.S. from the war in Vietnam more than any actual neglect.
Post-war spending is invariably lower than wartime levels. Second, defense budgets and
outlays began to grow during the last two years of the Ford presidency, continued in-
creasing through the Carter presidency, and were projected to grow rapidly thereafter.
See Komer, supra note 1, at 76-77. Third, dollars are not an adequate measure of the
quality and composition of military forces.
Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird notes that the Nixon and Ford Adminis-
trations made major commitments to strategic programs and conventional forces, de-
spite lower spending, because the end of the Vietnam war freed resources fr-oni wartine
draining. As Laird put it: "in our conventional force structure after Vietnam. we re-
sponded to severe constraints with personnel cuts, increased sectirity assistance, and
reserve strength which brought us, in my estimation, to a leaner but still strong force
posture .... " Laird, supra note I, at 8.
7. Critics argue that weak U.S. conventional forces and low defense spending inl the
1970s encouraged the Soviet Union to attempt to expand its overseas iniltence. As
some critics note: "The point is not that the Soviet Union has been particularly snicess-
ful in seeking an enduring influence, but rather that it judged, at least titil Presidet
Reagan entered office, the evolving correlation of forces in the 1970s in be stporive of
a bold foreign policy with a military cast.- Gray & Barlow sitpra note I. at 47.
8. In his last month in oflice. President Carter proposed a live year defense plan
involving spending levels significantly above earlier pro jcctions, allowing for 5.8% aver-
age annual growth after inflation. Since it was assumed that inflation rates would relain
high. as ihey had been during tihe late 1970s, these budget projections appear similar to
those actually carried out by the Reagan Administration. However, as noted below, ac-
tual inflation rates have been substantially lower than projected. The W'einberger l)e-
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tion came into office with a commitment to increase defense budgets
even more rapidly, which it accomplished basically by simply in-
creasing the amounts in all the programs for which Carter had re-
quested funds.9 Although Congress made some changes in the
Reagan Administration's first few requests, by and large it approved
these defense budgets.' 0
The growth in the defense budget in the first half of the 1980s was
startling. Defense budget authority more than doubled, rising from
$143.9 billion in FY 1980 to $294.7 billion in FY 1985, while actual
defense spending or outlays nearly doubled."I By 1986, this dra-
fense Department tends to argue that the dollar differences in budget authority and
outlays show that Congress has cut the Reagan program back to Carter levels, but the
difference in inflation rates played a substantially larger role through FY 1985. See gener-
ally MARONI, CRS STUDY, supra note 2. The Carter Administration also withdrew the
SALT II treaty from Senate consideration for ratification in 1979, in part because it
feared that the negative mood of the country about the nation's defense would make
ratification impossible.
9. Initially, the Defense Department added $6.8 billion to the Carter Administra-
tion's defense budget for FY 1981, the fiscal year then in progress. Rapid revisions
added $25.8 billion to the FY 1982 defense budget requested by outgoing Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown. Congress agreed to add $4.8 billion to the FY 1981 budget and
$15.2 billion to the FY 1982 amount originally requested by Secretary Brown. These
congressional actions meant that the FY 1980 to FY 1982 growth amounted to $35.6
billion in FY 1980 constant dollars (after inflation) or an average annual real growth rate
of roughly 12%. Carter had projected real growth rates of 7.0% and 5.3% for these two
fiscal years. See MARONI, CRS STUDY, supra note 2, at 6; DBP ANALYTICAL TABLES, s1pra
note 6, at Table IV.
One of the first planning documents submitted by Secretary of Defense Weinberger
for FY 1982 was literally a xerox of the Brown document with old numbers of units and
dollar amounts struck out and new ones added by hand. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
BUDGET FOR FY 1982: PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS By WEAPONS SYSTEM 6-36, 46-47,
73-80, 101 (1981). See also Stubbing, The Defense Program: Buildup or Bnge?, 1985 FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 848.
David Stockman emphasizes the speed of this process and the desire to make dollar
increases the symbol of the incoming Reagan Administration's commitment to a
stronger defense. See STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: WHY THE REAGAN REVOLU-
TION FAILED 105-09, 284-98 (1986).
10. According to constant dollar data analyzed by the Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Congress provided 96.8% of the Administration's defense requests, after inflation,
between FY 1981 and FY 1985. Between FY 1981 and FY 1985, the Defense Depart-
ment requested $1.235 billion and Congress provided $1.177 billion, or $58 billion less
than requested. See MARONI, CRS STUDY, supra note 2, at 6. See generally G. ADAMS &J.
COL.MAN, THE FY 1987 [)EFENSE BUDGET PRELIMINARY ANAIYSIS, 2-3 (Deflense Budget
Project, Feb. 5, 1986) [hereinafter 1987 BUDGET ANA.YSIS]. The rate of congressional
approval of Reagan Administration defense budget requests in the early 1980s is high
when compared with historical experience. See E. Koi.ODZIEJ, TIE UNCOMMON DEFENSE
AND CONGRESS, 1945-1963 (1966).
11. Removing the effects of inflation, national defense budget authority rose 55.9%
between FY 1980 and FY 1985. Defense outlays rose dramatically front $134 billion in
FY 1980 to $252.7 billion, an increase of 38. 1% after inflation. The average annual rate
of growth in defense budget authority between these years was 9.3% while outlavs rose
6.7%, alter inflation. Defense Budget Project calculations of growth alter inflation are
based on data contained in OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BRDGET, HISTORICAl. TABLES.
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matic growth in the budget brought military spending to historically
high levels' 2 that had been unimaginable in the 1970s.
The impact of this spending on American military strength has
been marginally positive; American armed forces are stronger and
more capable than they were in 1980. It is less clear, however, that
such extraordinary levels of spending have added in equivalent mea-
sure to the quality, fighting capability, training or readiness of the
military services. Nor is it clear that record defense spending has
significantly altered the military balance between the United States
and the Soviet Union.13 Although the legacy of the military buildup
for U.S. national security is not entirely clear, its legacy for the fiscal
management of defense in the remainder of the decade is more
certain.
B. Investment-Driven Defense and the "Appropriations Mountain"
The heart of the fiscal dilemma lies in the change in the composi-
tion of defense budgets since 1980. DoD's military buildup has em-
phasized rapid growth in funding for defense investment as
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1987, at Table 3.1 (1986) [hereinafter
OMB HISTORICAL TABLES].
12. National defense outlays in FY 1985 surpassed those of all peacetime years since
FY 1946 in constant dollars; only the peak years of the wars in Korea (1953 and 1954)
and Vietnam (1968 and 1969) saw higher spending levels. See 1987 BUDGET ANALYSIS,
supra note 10, at Table II.
13. While it is not the purpose of this article to evaluate in detail the changes in U.S.
forces or to make comparisons with the USSR, it is worth noting that while U.S. forces
are clearly stronger than in 1980, several analysts have pointed out the relatively mini-
mal improvements that have resulted from that buildup to date: e.g., improvements in
quality of personnel, but not in numbers; equipment expenditures that do not result in a
proportionate amount of equipment added to units; ship retirements offsetting addi-
tions to the fleet; some marginal increase in steaming, flying and training hours. See
Aspin, Defense Budgets Up - Whither Security?: What Have We Gotten For a Trillion
Dollars?, House Armed Services Comm. Press Release, (Oct. 7, 1985); U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, IMPROVEMENTS IN WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY, FY 1980-1984 (1984).
Soviet force additions and improvements have largely kept pace, though the Central
Intelligence Agency has concluded that Soviet defense spending overall and procure-
ment spending in particular have been lower both than previous estimates and than
actual U.S. spending. Seej. COL.LINS, U.S. - SOVIET MI.ITARY BALANCE: ASSESSMENTS
ANI) STrATISTICS. 1980-1985 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 85-89-S.
Spring 1985); StIBCOMM. ON ECON. RESOURCES, COMPETITIVENESS, AND SECtrIY OF THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 99TH, CONG., 2n. SESS., TIE SOVIET ECONOMY UNDER A NEW
L.EAIER (C.I.A. & Deknse Intelligence Agency Report, 1986).
Some critics argue that despite spending growth. actual perlibmance capabilities of
U.S. firces are seriously deft:ctive. See (;ABRIEI.. MI.TrARY INCOMPETENCE: WHY THE
AMERICAN MIi.ITARY' l)OESN'T WIN 187-199 (1985): TOWARD A MORE EFFEtCrIVE lIEFENSI:
(B. Blechman & W. LvI\nl eds. 1985); G. HART & W. lAND, AMERICA C.AN WIN: IlE CASstE
FOR MIIIARY REFORM (1986); L. i.IrTW. "lltE PENTAGON AND TiHE ART OF %A'.%R 185-
203. 252-286 (1984); li.I)I, TIIE STRAW GIANT: "iTRIUMPHn AND FlILURE, ANIERICA'S
ARMEu.-D FoRc:Es: A REPORT FROM Tr 1:E.1) (1986).
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opposed to defense consumption.' 4 This investment spending has
included significant increases in the procurement of weapons initi-
ated during the previous Administration as well as dramatic growth
in research and development funding.
The initial step toward an investment-driven defense budget took
place when the new Administration revised the final Carter defense
budget. The sharpest contrast between the Carter budget and the
Reagan revision lay in plans to purchase dramatically greater num-
bers of weapons whose development was initiated in the late 1970s.
Rather than outline a new defense strategy and acquisition plan, De-
fense Secretary Casper Weinberger's first budget simply expanded
and accelerated the procurement "bow wave"' 5 begun under
Carter's Defense Secretary, Harold Brown. In this first Reagan de-
fense budget, for example, the Carter plan to buy 569 M-1 tanks was
expanded to 720 M-I tanks and planned procurement of the F-16
fighter rose from 96 to 120 planes.' 6 These initial procurement de-
cisions created the framework for subsequent DoD budget requests.
As a result, the investment side of defense spending (research and
development, procurement and military construction) would con-
tinue to grow far more rapidly than spending for operations and
maintenance or personnel.
Overall, between FY 1980 and FY 1985, investment grew 95 per-
cent after inflation, while budgets for operations and maintenance
grew 37.1 percent and personnel grew only 13.2 percent.' 7 This
14. The Defense Department uses the term "investment" to mean spending on
weapons and other hardware, research and development, and military construction.
The term "consumption" is used here to refer to DoD spending on personnel and oper-
ations and maintenance.
15. A procurement "bow wave" occurs when a large number of research and devel-
opment programs are up for a production decision at the same time. When these pro-
grams are approved, they require major spending for production, causing significant
pressures to increase procurement spending in the defense budget.
16. Other significant increases over the initial Carter plan included: 464 v. 600
Bradley fighting vehicles; 30 v. 42 F-15 fighters; 2 v. 3 G-47 guided missile cruisers; 4 v.
12 A-6 attack planes; 58 v. 63 F-18 fighters; 130 v. 364 Patriot missiles; 480 v. 1800
Sidewinder missiles; I v. 3 guided missile frigates. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE. DEI..ENSF,
DEP'T BUDGET FOR FY 1982: PRO;RAM ACQUISITION COSTS BY WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR FY
1982 (1981); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE DEP'T BUDGET FOR FY 1982: PRO;R.\,t
AcQuISflON Cos-rs By WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR FY 1982 (revised March 1981 by the W\ein-
berger )efense l)epartment). The only major new program undertaken by the Vein-
berger Defense )epartment was the revival of the B-i Bomber program, production of
which had been cancelled by President Carter in June 1977.
17. )EFENSE BUD;GET PROJEcr. THE FY 19816 )E:FENSE BUDGWET: lHi \EAP'oNs
BItiI.ntmI CONTINUES (1985) [ hereinafter cited as WVEAPOSllNS Btlutm': I)BI' AA.\YrA.,
l'\11,E s, s/nra note 6, (calculations based oil ) ) data, using detlal s sutpplied by the
l)efense l)epartment). Set U.S. )E,"m' OF DEF.N:E (COMI'IROL.LER). NAIONAI. ),FE.NSE
BUDI ;T ESTIMATES FOR FY 1987. at 97, 106 (1986) I[hereinafter 1987 BUtD;rT Es-r,-
mxrEs I. See alsoJ. EPSTEIN, THE 1987 )EFENSIE Bluro;t.'T 7-8 (1986).
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rapid growth drove the investment share of the defense budget from
37.7 percent in FY 1980 to 47.8 percent in FY 1985.18 The change
in the composition of the defense budget laid the basis for the
strong structural pressure to continue to seek rapid growth in future
defense budgets.
The most important by-product of the emphasis on investment
spending has been DoD's accumulation of an unprecedented back-
log of appropriated but unexpended funds. When the defense
budget is comprised of a rapidly rising share of investment spend-
ing, actual outlays tend to lag well behind budget authority, since
weapons programs take several years to complete. In contrast, vir-
tually all funds allocated for personnel are spent in the first year for
which they were appropriated. The backlog grows out of the way in
which investment programs are funded in the defense budget.
When approved by Congress, an investment program is "fully
funded" in the appropriations act; Congress provides the full
amount of funds that DoD anticipates the proposed program will
require through completion. Congress does not reconsider each
annual outlay for a fully-funded program, then, because it has al-
ready provided the necessary budget authority at the start.
For example, in FY 1985, Congress appropriated $7.48 billion for
34 B-1B bombers. This amount was intended to cover the full costs
of building those aircraft, the last of which might be delivered as late
as 1988.19 Although a contract for these bombers was signed in the
first year for which funds were appropriated, obligating part of
those funds, actual spending on the program will occur over time. A
certain proportion of appropriated funds will be obligated in the
same year in which they were appropriated; however, another por-
tion of these funds will not be spent until future years, since the
outlay rate is lower than the obligation rate.20
18. The investment share reached 48.5% in the FY 1986 defense budget. See DBP
ANALYTICAL TABLES, supra note 6, at Table VI.
19. J. COLMAN & R. MADRID, TIlE PENTAGON FUNDING BACKLOG: CAN THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT MANAGE MORE GROWNTH? 5-6 (Defense Budget Project, May 1986).
20. On average, more than 80% of appropriated procurement funds will have been
obligated in the first year. Changes in obligation rates can reflect the case (or dificutly)
with which DoD is locating contractors for a given program. Current law requires that
funds for specific programs be obligated (ustiallv through contracts) within a given pe-
riod of time: military personnel-one year; operations and inaintenalCe-one year; re-
search and development-two years; procurenent-three years: ship construction-five
years; military construction-five years. Funds not obligated by the end of these time
periods normally revert to the Treastury )epartlment. Ai)propriated fiunds that hae not
vet been obligated to a con tract are Cotlled as part of tfie Defense I)epartlmen l 's "llol)-
ligated funding balances." See .1. COIMAN & R. MDnIsD. .u/rIu note 19. at 5. See in/it
n1otes 24-28 and acconpanving text for fturther discussion lof these balances.
Yale Law & Policy Review
The outlay rate is considerably lower for procurement programs
than the rate of spending on operations and maintenance or person-
nel. Only 13 to 14 percent of procurement outlays occur during the
first year for which the funds were appropriated; 75 percent are
spent by the end of the third year.2 1 While total national defense
budget authority more than doubled in current dollars between FY
1980 and FY 1985, the Defense Department's "appropriations
mountain" of unexpended funds actually grew 165 percent, rising
from $92.2 billion to $244.4 billion. 22
Another major fiscal consequence of large appropriations for in-
vestment programs (most of which are obligated to existing con-
tracts), is a significant increase in the share of annual defense
spending which is uncontrollable. In planning a defense budget,
Congress projects an outlay level for a given fiscal year. When a
substantial portion of prior appropriations is obligated to contracts
which require spending in subsequent years, Congress' ability to
control outlay levels is diminished.
In 1980, the Office of Management and Budget estimated that just
over a quarter (27 percent) of defense outlays were "uncontrolla-
ble" because they flowed from funds appropriated in previous years
and obligated to contracts. By 1985 the uncontrollable share of an-
nual defense outlays had risen to 36.4 percent due to the shift to
investment programs and the subsequent growth of the appropria-
tions mountain. Combined with outlays devoted to salaries and
wages for uniformed and civilian personnel (roughly 50 percent an-
nually), well over 80 percent of defense outlays are now basically
uncontrollable, unless serious reductions in personnel are made.2 3
21. Outlay rates are provided in U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE DEP'T BUDGET FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1987: FINANCIAL SUMMARY TABLES FOR FY 1987 (1984) [hereinafter SUtis-
MARY TABLES]; See also DBP ANALYTICAL TABLES, supra note 6, at Table XII.
22. The bulk of the backlog (more than 70%) is committed to investment programs.
SeeJ. COI.MAN & R. MADRID, supra note 19 (calculations based on DoD data supplied by
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller). See also J. EPSTEIN. s1pra
note 17, at 6-9. It is important to note that this "mountain" does not represent actual
ftunds held in reserve or earning interest. As a result of prior appropriations, the De-
fense )epartment has the right to request funds from the TreasurV tip to the iotal
amount distributed by program, as those fhnds are required flor 1)o) outlays.
23. See G. ADAMS &J. COIMAN, 1tpra note 4; 1987 BtDGET EsTIMATs. smpra note 17.
at 18. which notes growth in uncontrollability based on budget doctnents. See also J.
E'STEIN, ,lto]fa note 17. at 7. In theory, existing procurement contracts could be can-
celled. The savings from such terminations, however, are uncertain, since virtually all
major )rocutrelentI contracts contain cancellation clauses which reiml)urse contractors
[or the elfct f prcmatuire cancellialion. The total dollar value of such clauses is
unknown.
Vol. 5:7, 1986
Defense Choices and Resource Constraints
C. The Pentagon's Dollar Digestion Problem
There is some evidence that the growth in DoD's backlog is also
due to the Department's inability to digest its large investment-
driven mountain as rapidly as the funds have been appropriated.
The backlog of unexpended funds for procurement programs is
growing more rapidly than the actual addition of new procurement
funds to the defense budget. Since FY 1982, the ratio of obligated
but unexpended procurement funds to new procurement appropria-
tions has grown steadily from rough parity (1.05:1) to a large over-
hang of obligated but unexpended balances in FY 1985 (1.24:1).24
The growth in the backlog of funds obligated to a contract but not
yet spent has been accompanied by similar growth in the backlog of
funds which have not been obligated to any contract - the "unobli-
gated funding balances." Although continually requesting higher
appropriations, the Defense Department has been unable to acceler-
ate the rate at which it obligates funds to new contracts. Unobli-
gated balances increased 154 percent, from $24.2 billion to $61.5
billion, between FY 1980 and FY 1985.25
Some growth in the backlog of unobligated funds might be con-
sidered normal. Defense spending increases in the past, however,
have not led to growth in the unobligated balances of the sort ex-
perienced during the first five years of this decade, suggesting that
the Pentagon is having difficulties managing the funds it has re-
ceived. In fact, Reagan's Department of Defense has not been able
to obligate funds any faster than previous administrations, although
it has requested greater increases in appropriations.2 6
There is also mounting evidence that the Defense Department is
not able to spend its obligated funds as fast as it has in the past.
DoD clearly overestimated what it could purchase in the years be-
24. DoD projections for FY 1986 and FY 1987 forecast even greater growth in this
ratio: FY 1986 - 1.45:1; FY 1987 - 1.58:1. Calculated by Defense Budget Project fiom
data in SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 21.
25. See SJMMARY TABLES, supra note 21, at Report 9.
26. The GAO calculated that historical trends suggest the obligation rate for FY
1984 should have been 84.8%. The actual rate - 85.4% - was consistent with this
historical trend, but also well below DoD's projected rate for that year, 88.6%. The Air
Force appears to have a particular problem with obligations. From FY 1980 through FY
1985, unobligated funds in Air Force programs increased from $4.2 billion to $19.7
billion, a growth rate of 369%. See SUMMARY T'ABI.ES, supra note 21. at Report 9. Such
large unobligatcd balances do give the Defense Department an unusual degree of flexi-
bility. Although the unobligated finding balances have been appropriated for specific
programs and much of them will be spent for those purposes, through reprogramming
actions the Pentagon can redirect those funds to other programs for which there was no
initial appropriation or for which appropriated funds were inadequate.
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tween FY 1982 and FY 1986, and one result has been the systematic
stretchout of weapons purchases since FY 1983.27 A stretchout gen-
erally occurs when costs have risen and/or budget resources are in-
adequate to fund the number of units of a given program that were
originally planned. Stretchouts can also occur, however, when pro-
duction rates are slower than expected and/or the Department sim-
ply cannot obligate and spend as quickly as predicted. Rather than
set priorities among programs in order to produce some weapons at
higher, cost-efficient levels, DoD (or Congress) reduces the number
to be bought in a given year and pushes the remaining units into
future budget years. Stretchouts have a significant impact on the
ultimate cost of a program. The decision to purchase the remaining
units in the future raises total program costs since, ceteris paribus,
prices will be higher in the future and the new, slower rate of pro-
duction is likely to be less economically efficient. 28
D. Excess Funds and the Inflation Dividend
The emphasis on investment of defense budgets of the mid-1980s
has left yet another difficult legacy for defense budget planners.
Some proportion of the "appropriations mountain" consists simply
of excess funds which proved to be unnecessary for their original
purposes. DoD has argued since 1981 that its budget requests are
free of such excess or unneeded funds and consequently that Con-
gress cannot make cuts without doing severe damage to the defense
program. In fact, from FY 1982 on, the Department and Congress
have repeatedly found significant excess funds in the procurement
accounts .2)
Some of the funding excess results from an "inflation dividend,"
which grows directly out of the defense budget's emphasis on in-
vestment programs. For such programs, budget planners seek
27. Published Defense Department data show that the Pentagon is spending its ap-
propriated funds at slower and slower rates since the defense buildup began. Rates for
defense spending have declined steadily since FY 1980. In the investment categories,
31.8% of the appropriated funds available for procurement spending were actually
spent in FY 1980, a rate which had declined to 28.3% in FY 1985. More dramatically.
research and development spending rates fell from 65.1% in FY 1980 to 56.6% in FY
1985, while military construction spending rates fell from 39.9% to 30.9%. SeeJ. Coi.-
MAN & R. MADRID, supra note 19, at Table IV (calculations based on DoD-reported outlay
data).
28. See WEAPONS BUILDUP, sipra note 17, at Table 10. See also General Accounting
Office, Underestimation of Funding Requirements In Five Year Procurement Plans
(Mar. 12, 1984) (briefing paper).
29. Seej. CO.MAN & R. MADRID, sUPra note 19; Aspin, Coverage. Cumulation, and
Compensation or Wherefore Art Thou Inflation Dividend?, House Armed Services
Comm. Press Release, at 7-9 (Sept. 3, 1986) Ihereinafter Aspin. Coverage].
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funds to be spent over several years based on a prediction of the
future rate of inflation. If inflation is higher than planned, as in the
late 1970s, available funds are inadequate and more must be sought.
When inflation is lower than anticipated, as has been true for much
of the early part of the 1980s, the "inflation dividend" is the differ-
ence between the amount appropriated for projected inflation and
the amount required to cover actual inflation. 30
In times of lower-than-anticipated inflation, an investment-driven
defense budget leaves a large inflation dividend. Such a gap does
not occur with personnel spending because a pay increase is built
into initial budget planning and provided largely in the first year in
which appropriated funds are spent. Nor does a dividend occur
with spending for operations and maintenance (O&M). Roughly
three quarters of the funds appropriated for O&M are spent in the
first year for which they were appropriated. Incorrect estimates of
inflation are therefore less serious in these parts of the defense
budget. 3 1
Since recent defense budgets have emphasized investment and in-
flation has been lower than anticipated, the Defense Department has
regularly received a sizeable inflation dividend. The actual size of
the dividend since 1982 is not clear; Defense Department account-
ing practices make it hard to separate excess funds resulting from
inflation overestimates from funds that were not needed for other
reasons. The General Accounting Office has estimated that the in-
30. This is exacerbated by the fact that starting in FY 1983, the Defense Department
was provided with a special inflation index for major weapons systems, permitting it to
add a 30% premium to annual inflation projections for these systems. For example, if
the GNP price index projected inflation of 10% for a given year, DoD could budget for
13% in weapons inflation. DoD argued that the additional 30% premium was necessary
because costs rose faster for major systems than for other items. The allowance was
used by the Pentagon through the FY 1986 defense budget. For a detailed analysis of
and data on the inflation dividend, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT No. 85-
145, POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS FUNDS IN DOD (1985); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PO-
TENTIAL FOR EXCESS FUNDS IN DOD - MARCH 1986 UPDATE (1986); CONGRESSIONAL.
BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETING FOR DEFENSE INFLATION (1986): 131 CONG. REC. 2277-79
(1985) (statement of Rep. Aspin); Hearing in Comection With Defense JIflation Before the
Economic Subcomm. on Resources. Competitiveness, and Security of theJoilt Economic Comm.. 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (July 18, 1986) (statement of Robert W. Helm. Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Comptroller).
31. For a comparison of the varying rates at which appropriated funds are spent, see
A. MARONI & R. FOELBER, TlE GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DEFICIT REDUCTION PROCESS
(P.I,. 99-177) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: A SUMMARY REVIEW 11, n. 10 (Con-
gressional Research Service Report No. 98-7F, 1986).
The principal inflation dividend in the operations and maintenance account has re-
stilted from far-lower-than-anticipated fuel costs due to the drop in the price of oil. See
CBO, sura note 30, at 22-23 (noting that fuel cost increases in 1979 and 1980 cut opera-
lions and maintenance funding).
Yale Law & Policy Review
flation dividend between FY 1982 and FY 1986 amounted to $44.52
billion.3 2
Inflation savings and other excess funds have become a regular
feature of the debate over the recent military buildup. In May of
1985, for example, Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced $4
billion in savings resulting from lower-than-anticipated inflation in
the FY 1984-FY 1986 budgets.33 Later that year, the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees found additional savings in ex-
cess funds of between $1.5 and $3.7 billion. In conference, the two
committees compromised on $6.3 billion in savings of funds no
longer needed for the programs for which they were originally ap-
propriated. The funds were transferred to other programs, includ-
ing military pay and retirement, the Coast Guard, and a maritime
shipbuilding subsidy program. 34
The existence of this inflation dividend has given both the De-
fense Department and Congress greater flexibility with respect to
defense programs. Each year since FY 1983, the Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees have reduced the Administration's
budget proposal, citing, in part, the inclusion of excess funds in the
request.35 Such reductions have not caused major changes in the
Defense Department's programs. This result seems to confirm Con-
gress' assertion that some excess funds were requested. For FY
1985, for example, Congress appropriated $21 billion less than the
Defense Department requested. Yet 0MB Director David Stockman
testified that "about 30 percent of the cut that was made can be said
... to involve significant program differences, but even there you
will see nothing big, nothing major, nothing with longterm cost im-
plications that was seriously cut."3 6
32. GAO UPDATE, supra note 30. $16-32 billion of the inflation dividend could not
be identified due to unclear DoD accounting practices. This figure includes $14.7 bil-
lion from the 30% kicker. Aspin, Coverage, supra note 29, at 2.
33. Towell, Midnight Surprise Sparks Questions in Congress, 51 CONG. Q 1065, 1066
(1985).
34. FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY 1986, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 443.
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
35. For example, the Senate Armed Forces Services Committee identified $6 billion
in inflation savings in FY 1985-1987, See 132 CONG. REc. S10,174-76 (daily ed. Aug. 1.
1986) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). The Senate Appropriations Committee identified
nearly $5.4 billion in inflation savings in the FY 1987 budget. S. REP. No. 446. 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986).
36. First Concirrent Resolution on the Budget - Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Budget, 99th Cong., I st Sess. 17 (1985) (testimony of David Stockman, Dir..
OMB). Stockman noted that $5.5 billion involved "minor or modest quibbles" about
procurement; $8.8 billion was saved in updated, lower cost estimates, and $6.2 billion
involved actual program changes. Id. at 32-33.
Vol. 5:7, 1986
Defense Choices and Resource Constraints
Excess funds, which are to be found in both the obligated and
unobligated shares of the appropriations mountain, also provide the
Defense Department with flexibility to expand the defense program
beyond what was originally approved by Congress. In every fiscal
year DoD reprograms some of these funds, applying them to ex-
isting weapons programs which require additional funds or to new
programs for which funds had not originally been requested.3 7 The
battleship Wisconsin, for example, is being refurbished and modi-
fied using unneeded funding balances from other shipbuilding
accounts .38
The General Accounting Office concluded that such excess funds
have continued to appear in the Defense Department's accounts.
Through the first half of FY 1986, for example, DoD itself identified
$3.9 billion in new excess funds, some part of which was, again, an
inflation dividend.3 9 The availability of such excess funds adds to
the resources the Pentagon can obligate and continue to spend in
coming years, putting further upward pressure on defense
spending.
E. Summary
By the beginning of FY 1986, DoD budget and spending practices
of the first half of the decade had left a legacy of systematic upward
momentum in defense spending. The shift in defense priorities
from consumption to investment had created a huge spending back-
log, or "appropriations mountain." The large backlog, much of
which is tied to existing weapons contracts, has made each year's
defense outlays increasingly uncontrollable. In addition, the back-
log has contained significant amounts of excess funds, adding to the
Department's flexibility to make additional spending commitments.
Moreover, the Department has encountered persistent problems in
37. Reprogramming allows the Defense Department to move funds to other ac-
counts or other programs within the same account. If such actions add to the number of
units of a weapon already appropriated by Congress, they require the approval of the
appropriate committees of Congress - Armed Services and Appropriations. Above
given thresholds ($10 million for procurement and $4 million for research and develop-
ment), these committees must be notified of reprogramming actions.
38. SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS. DEP'T OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION Bit.[.,
1986, S. REP. No. 176, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1985); HOUsE COMM. ON APPROPRIA-
TIONS, i)EP'T OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BmI.. 1986. H. REP. No. 332, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 205-206 (1985).
39. Letters from Secretary of 1)efense Caspar Weinberger to Sen. Barry Goldwater.
Chairman, Senate Comm. on Armed Services (Mar. 3. 1986 and May 29, 1986) (detail-
ing reapplication of inflation dividend savings in FYs 1982-85, and identifying savings in
FY 1986 budget requests).
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obligating and spending its funding balances as fast as they have
accumulated. The slower outlay of funds has added further to the
spending pressures, because the stretchout of major weapons
purchases raises total program costs.The immediate effect of the Defense Department's investment-
driven budget has been that actual defense spending has continued
to rise in FY 1986 and FY 1987, despite congressional action which
has essentially frozen defense budget authority. In FY 1986, na-
tional defense budget authority actually fell nearly 6 percent (after
inflation) from FY 1985 levels, while actual defense outlays rose by
2.3 percent. Moreover, defense outlays for FYs 1987-89 will con-
tinue to be fueled by outlays which flow from the backlog.40
II. Pressures on Future Defense Spending
A. The Legacy of the First Five Years
The fiscal legacy of the defense buildup is now creating pressures
on future defense spending. Investment programs continue to ab-
sorb a large share of the FY 1986 and FY 1987 defense budgets, and
Defense Department projections indicate that future requests will
continue this trend. 4' Since these investment programs will contrib-
ute to the existing appropriations mountain, the Department antici-
pates that the backlog will continue to grow and that a large share of
total defense spending will remain uncontrollable. 42 The backlog
40. 1987 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 2-3. National defense outlays for FY
1987 are projected to rise by at least $6 billion, while budget authority may actually be
roughly $2 billion below the FY 1986 level. According to DoD data, roughly 4 1 % of a
given year's outlays are the result of prior-year appropriations, while the other 59% are
the first-year outlay results of new budget authority, primarily for personnel and opera-
tions and maintenance. Defense Budget Project calculations are based on data in SUM-
MARY TABLES, supra note 21, at Report 9. See also ANALYTICAL TABLES, sipra note 6, at
Table 10. and sources discussing the growing portion of the defense budget that is un-
controllable, supra note 23.
41. Based on the Defense Department's FY 1987 budget request of $320.3 billion,
roughly 48.5% would be for investment, while the FY 1988 budget projects a figure of
roughly 45%. The balance within the investment category shifted somewhat from pro-
curement, which grew slightly in the FY 1987 budget request, to research and develop-
ment, for which growth over 20% (after inflation) was requested. Congress has
somewhat slowed the investment trend by reducing the FY 1987 budget requests for
procurement and R&D more sharply than the requests for personnel and O&M. See
Aspin, House Armed Services Committee Approves FY 87 Defense Authorization Bill,
House Armed Services Comm. Press Release (une 26. 1986). See also J. COLMAN & R.
MADRID. sipra note 19, at Table III (calculations based on DoD data); 1987 BUDGET
ANALYSIS, Su/ra note 10. at Table IV.
42. 1)oD projects growth in its backlog from $270.6 billion at the end of FY 1986 to
$304.1 billion by the end of FY 1987. This estimate is based on the Defense Depart-
ment's FY 1987 budget request of $320 billion in budget atrthority and thus precedes
the impact of FY 1986 cuts under (,ramm-Rtudman-Hollings and the final congressional
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will be exacerbated by the Pentagon's continuing inability to obli-
gate and spend funds. 43 Weapons stretchouts will also continue to
be proposed either by the Pentagon because it cannot obligate
funds quickly enough or by Congress as it sets budget authority be-
low levels requested by the Administration. DoD will continue to
find and use excess funds to expand programs in other areas. 44
The fiscal legacy from the early 1980s is now being joined by new
pressures which originate in the investment-driven defense budget.
A new wave of weapons reaching the procurement stage, rising re-
quirements for personnel and for operations and maintenance, and
renewed growth in the cost of weapons programs will create new
pressures for increased defense budgets for the rest of the decade
and into the 1990s.
B. Research and Development: The Next "Bow-Wave"
The most serious pressure on future defense spending will be the
forthcoming procurement bow wave, which has been foreshadowed
by rapid growth in research and development (R&D) spending over
the past five years. While the bulk of defense investment funds dur-
ing that period was devoted to producing weapons, R&D spending
also grew rapidly, rising from $13.6 billion in FY 1980 to the FY
appropriation of $290 billion for national defense. These changes are likely to reduce
the growth trend in the backlog slightly. See SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 2 1. at Report
9. According to DOD data, the ratio between the obligated procurement backlog and
new procurement budget authority will rise to even higher levels: 1.45:1 in FY 1986 and
1.58:1 in FY 1987. SeeJ. COLMAN & R. MADRID, supra note 19, at Table III (calculations
made from table).
43. DOD data show that the Department's spending rates for procurement are pro-
jected to fall to 28.3% by FY 1987; research and development to 47.6%; and military
construction to 27.7%. SeeJ. COLMAN & R. MADRID, supra note 19, at Table IV. There
are also indications that the Defense Department may be underestimating its outlays
over the next few years, in part, perhaps, to keep overall federal budget deficit projec-
tions low. Comparing DoD's forecasts to the spending of the Pentagon backlog that is
likely to result (based on numbers generated when historical outlay rates are applied to
DOD's projected budgets), both the Congressional Budget Office and the Brookings In-
stitution have suggested that outlays in the next three years may be significantly higher
than forecast. SeeJ. EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 1-4 (estimating that FY 1987 outlays may
be underestimated by $14.3 billion, while outlays between FY 1987 and FY 1991 could
be underestimated by $62 billion). See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF
TIlE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS FOR FISCAl. YEAR 1987. at 23 (1986). See also
GAO, supra note 28, at 1. OMB implicitly acknowledged in its midseason review of the
FY 1987 budget that DOD outlav forecasts were underestimated. OMB REVIEW, supra
note 5, at 34-36. See also Feuerbringer, 1ite House Says Deficil is Rising Above Estimates.
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1986, at AI, col. 4.
44. DoD continues to find excess funds, reporting almost $4 billion in the first half
of FY 1986 alone. See snpra note 39. See also S. REP. No. 446, spra note 35, at 11.
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1987 request for $41.9 billion, or 87.1 percent after inflation. 45 As
the House Armed Services Committee concluded in its review of the
Pentagon's FY 1987 R&D request, one dollar of funding for ad-
vanced or full scale engineering development generates ten or more
dollars in procurement, operations and support spending within five
to ten years. 46 In other words, the Pentagon's current research and
development program will likely dictate huge defense budget re-
quests for the 1990s.
As these R&D programs move through advanced and full-scale
engineering development toward production decisions, spending
on them will grow. Once in production, these programs will require
additional spending for training, personnel, and operations and
maintenance in the 1990s. A significant number of R&D programs
are nearing production decisions in the late 1980s. The Defense
Department has set few priorities among these programs to accom-
modate growing constraints on the overall defense budget.
As a result of the Administration's strategic modernization pro-
gram, many of the new strategic nuclear weapons systems are mov-
ing rapidly toward production decisions: the stealth bomber (first
deployment due around 1992), the Trident II missile (first produc-
tion funds provided in FY 1987 budget), a small, single-warhead
land-based ICBM ("Midgetman") (flight test in 1989 and initial de-
ployment in 1992), the Air Force's advanced air-launched cruise
missile (production just under way), and a new short-range attack
missile for the strategic bomber force (production decision in late
1980s).
While the strategic nuclear buildup has been the most visible as-
pect of growing research and development spending over the past
five years, several less-noticed conventional weapons programs are
also entering advanced or full-scale engineering development, with
45. The House Armed Services Committee authorized a lower amount - $35.7 bil-
lion - while the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $37.2 billion. See HOUSE
COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1987, H.R. REP. No. 718, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1986); SENATE COMM. ON ARMED
SERVICES, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987, S. REP,. No.
331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1986); 1987 BUDGET ANALYSIS, snpia note 10, at Table
III (1)cfense Budget Project calculations based on data from above sources).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 718, supra note 45, at 109. The Congressional Budget Office
has argued that without appropriate attention to priorities, a new wave of "investment
driven" defense budgets could emerge in the 1990s. "Unless enough discipline is
placed on the weapons development process, current R&D expenditures could become
precursors to higher weapons development budgets in the future." CONGRESSIONAL,
BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVEIOPMENT FUNDING IN THE PROPOSED FISCAl. YEAR
1985 BIxUDGEr, at 25 (Special Study, Mar. 1984).
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production decisions scheduled between 1986 and the early 1990s.
These include: the Air Force's C-17 cargo plane, the advanced, me-
dium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM), and the advanced tech-
nology fighter (which may also be a stealth fighter); the Navy's SSN-
21 submarine and advanced technology aircraft; the Marines' V-22
Osprey aircraft; the Army's LHX light helicopter, new air defense
system and anti-armor weapons; and such joint programs as the
JSTARS radar system and the JTACMS tactical cruise missile pro-
gram. In addition to these full systems, each service is also con-
ducting research and development on a large number of electronics
and communications systems, such as SUBACS for the Navy's SSN-
21 submarine and the SINGCARS communications system for the
Army, which will enter production at the same time.
While these strategic nuclear and conventional systems already
raise significant spending problems for the next decade, the budget-
ary problems are compounded by the Strategic Defense Initiative.
DoD plans to request more than $40 billion between FY 1984 and
FY 1991 for research and development of SDI. 47 In addition, there
is growing concern in Congress that R&D spending on SDI will be
costly for other R&D programs; funds which could be used for the
development of the defense technology base or for new conven-
tional weapons will increasingly be diverted to SDI.
4 8
SDI could be a major force driving up defense budgets in the
1990s. It is currently estimated that, should SDI reach the point of
production and deployment in the next decade, the system (includ-
ing full development, deployment and ten years of maintenance)
would cost from $160 billion for a limited site defense to as much as
$770 billion for a fuller population defense. 491 Simply put, produc-
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, RD,T&E PROGRAMS (R-1), DEP'T OF DEFENSE
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987 (1986); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SELECTEID
WEAPONS COSTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S FY 1987 PROGRAM (Apr. 1986):J. PIKE. STRATE-
GIC DEFENSE BUDGET (Federation of American Scientists Report, 1986).
48. SDI funds would rise from 4.5% of the total DoD budget for R&D in FY 1984 to
an estimated 15% by FY 1989. ANA.-rICAL TABLES, supra note 6, at Table XII (Defense
Budget Project calculations). The problem of R&D competition within the defense
budget was noted by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in their
reviews of the FY 1987 R&D budget, and provisions were made to transfer some SDI
research funds to a Conventional Defense Initiative. [he House authorized $462 mil-
lion for this purpose in FY 1987, while the Senate authorized $453 million. See H.R.
RE'. No. 718, supra note 45, at 148-53: S. REP,. No. 331, supra note 45, at 182-83.
49. B. Blechman and V. Utsgoff, Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic 1)e-
fenses, E 4-6 (July 1986) (unpublished paper prepared for l'heJohns Hopkins Foreign
Policy Institute). SI)I might cost more than $1 trillion to deploy and maintain. 132
CONG. RE:. S 10,257-60 (daily ed. Aug. 4 1986) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). l'here is
growing evidence that cost concerns have even generated urgings that the Strategic l)e-
fense Initiative Organization concentrate its efforts on the short-terin goal of' protecting
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tion and deployment of strategic defenses could begin to absorb as
much as 10-15 percent of defense spending per year in the mid-
1990s.
Research and development spending increased dramatically be-
tween FY 1981 and FY 1987. Although the Pentagon projects that
R&D budgets themselves will remain stable for the next five years,
the legacy of R&D increases for the early 1980s can be seen in pro-
curement budget forecasts. DoD now projects that procurement
spending, which leveled off in FY 1987, will rise $30 billion above
the FY 1987 level over the next five years, reflecting the movement
of new systems into production during that time. This five-year in-
crease in procurement spending is equivalent to the increase in such
spending between FY 1982 and FY 1987, years of rapid growth in
the defense budget. 50
The tendency of R&D programs to move automatically into pro-
duction has been reinforced by trends inside recent R&D budgets
which make it more difficult for Congress to give these new pro-
grams close scrutiny. As the R&D budget becomes dominated by
more sophisticated electronics and communications devices, Con-
gress and its staff simply lack adequate time and expertise to evalu-
ate the technical characteristics of and the need for such
program s. 5'
Moreover, in the past five years, the cost of "black" or secret pro-
grams, such as the stealth bomber, stealth fighter, and the advanced
air-launched cruise missile, has grown 300 percent, from $5.5 bil-
lion in FY 1981 to an estimated $22 billion in DoD's FY 1987
budget request.52 Only a few Members of Congress and their staffs
have the necessary clearance to review such programs, and informa-
tion is lacking to evaluate them in public debate. The increasing
sophistication of the R&D budget will exacerbate Congress' ten-
dency to approve defense programs without setting priorities
among them.
Even though many current R&D programs will soon move into
production, the Defense Department's management of the R&D ac-
the survivability of U.S. missile sites and focus relatively less on population defense. See,
e.g., S. REi,. No. 331, supra note 45, at 181-82.
50. See DBP ANAL.-IICAI, TABI.ES, stpo note 6, at Table V1. Between FY 1982 and FY
1986 the defense procurement budget rose $28 billion. Calculations based on data in id.
51. The number of programs costing less than $100 million (man of which are elec-
tronics and communications systems) has risen irom 594 in FY 1976 to 734 in FY 1987.
H.R. REi,. No. 718, supra note 45, at 109.
52. Morrison, Ienlagoi i Top Secret Black' Bndte llas Sk vrketed During Reagao Yers,
IS N.'i"iJ..1. 492 (1986).
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count itself will also encourage continued high R&D outlays in the
coming years. As noted, the spending rate for the first year of R&D
appropriations has declined sharply in the 1980s, from 65.1 percent
in FY 1980 to a projected 47.6 percent in FY 1987. The R&D back-
log (obligated funding balance) has, as a result, risen from $6 billion
in FY 1980 to a projected $30.7 billion in FY 1987, a growth of 412
percent in current dollars. 5 3 The mounting backlog means that
R&D outlays will continue to grow in the remaining years of the
1980s. Increased R&D outlays will in turn spur higher production
spending and higher overall defense budgets.
C. Underestimated Weapons Costs
The anticipated bow wave of procurement in the next decade,
growing out of current R&D commitments, carries with it another
potential source of upward pressure on future defense spending:
rapidly increasing weapons costs. There have been few instances of
rapid increases in weapons costs in the first half of the decade, in
part because of the Weinberger Defense Department's basing of its
initial procurement needs on the weapons procurement plans al-
ready laid out by the Carter Administration. Most of the weapons
programs in the Carter budgets had already gone through the ini-
tial, less predictable stages of production and could be classified as
"mature," with fairly stable cost expectations. Only such relatively
new programs as the Navy's F-18 fighter showed unusual cost
growth in the early Weinberger years. 54
The inflation dividend also helped to lessen the rapid increases in
weapons costs during the first years of the decade. The Defense
Department regularly overestimated projected rates of inflation in
its budgets. As a result, the costs of some weapons systems (such as
the Air Force's C-5B) have actually been lower than anticipated. 55
Nonetheless, there are some indications that rising weapons costs
and DoD and contractor underestimates of expected costs will drive
up future defense spending. In 1983, the General Accounting Of-
fice projected higher-than-anticipated spending on major weapons
programs. It estimated that the major weapons programs initiated
between 1984 and 1988 could actually cost as much as $324 billion
53. SeeJ. COLMAN & R. MADRID. Sill)pil 1 9012 I, atPart I. Growth will be slightly lower
as a result of congressional reductions in the FY 1987 Dol) R&D request.
54. See Wilson, Navy Demands FIS Price Cut, Washington Post, Sept. I. 1982. at Al.
col. 2.
55. Kolkul. Low In/lation Enables I'S.IF to Cut C-51 Production Costs By $600 .1lillion,
AvIAnON WEEK. Aug. 4, 1986. at 127-131.
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more than the Defense Department anticipated.5"1 These projec-
tions also reflect a rise in weapons costs that is caused in part by the
stretchout of weapons programs.5 7 The ultimate impact of the post-
ponement of spending on these programs (implemented by DoD
and Congress) will be an increase in unit costs in the future, given
lower efficiency and regular price increases due to inflation.
Moreover, the procurement reforms undertaken by the Wein-
berger Pentagon have not eliminated the root causes of cost growth.
A sweeping review of DoD structures and practices concluded in
1985 that program cost growth for weapons has consistently aver-
aged between 50 and 100 percent of the original estimate. 58 Con-
tractors continue to have an incentive to "buy in" to a program,
bidding at a price which is below anticipated real costs in order to
acquire the initial contract. Once the program is under way, cost
growth is virtually axiomatic, 59 especially as contract profit rates are
calculated on the basis of costs as reported by the contractor. 60 In
addition, the Armed Services have relatively little motivation to re-
quest full budgets for weapons programs, since those programs with
lower projected costs are more likely than those with high ones to
win Office of Management and Budget approval. 61 These incentives
to underestimate initial costs contribute to an increase in weapons
costs.
In sum, although the stretchouts and procurement incentives
which fuel rising weapons costs were present at the beginning of
this decade, a rapid growth in weapons costs was offset by the infla-
tion dividend and the relatively stable cost estimates of the mature
weapons programs provided for in the early Weinberger budgets.
In contrast, the coming production decisions involve systems with
56. GAO, supra note 28, at I.
57. For a discussion of "stretchouts," see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
58. Report of the Working Group on Weapons Acquisition, in TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE
DEFENSE, snpra note 13, at 89. This finding seemed to be confirmed in AIR FORCE SYS-
TEMS COMMAND, TilE AFFORDABLE AcQUISITION APPROACH STUDY (1983).
59. The rare exception (o the automatic cost growth phenomenon occurs where in-
flation expectations are dramatically below those forecast in the original contract, as
appears to have happened with the C-5B program in the 1980s. Kolkul, stipra note 55, at
127-31.
60. [he i)efense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985, Pub. . No. 99-145. Title
IX, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN NEWS (99 Stat.) 587 required detailed
disclosures of raw material and labor costs by defense contractors in order to establish it
baseline for what weapons production "shotuld cost." The i)efnse Departlment and in-
dlslrv lobbvists made ellorts in 1986 to have that legislation repealed.
. Seet, Iepent of/ithe Steering Com,itlee. in IONVARI) .A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSI...// r(/
note 13, at 32. See oano.J. G;,NSLER, TlHE DEFENSE INDtUSnR (1984): G. AIsAS, Til.: I o.i-
TI:S OF DEFENSE (ONTRA(CTING: iHE IRON iRIAN(IEF, at (11. 1 (1982).
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far less stable cost expectations, which, combined with an absence of
priority-setting and continued stretchouts, will continue to fuel fu-
ture defense budgets.
D. Growing Demands for Personnel and O&M Funding
In the first half of the decade, budgets for personnel and for O&M
lagged well behind funding for investment. The new equipment in-
troduced in military units, however, requires skilled operators and
expanded force strength. Moreover, the new hardware, such as the
M-1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, or Maverick missile, is increas-
ingly sophisticated, requiring greater funding for O&M than its
predecessors. 62 The investment-driven budget of the early 1980s
thus creates pressures for increased funding to staff, operate and
maintain the additions to the military inventory, especially if readi-
ness levels are to be maintained.
While military wages have risen since 1981, personnel growth in
the Armed Services has been relatively slow. 63 The number of Army
active duty personnel in 1985 was the same as in 1981. 64 Air Force
active duty personnel rose by 32,000, but since the Air Force plans
to add new air wings, its personnel needs will continue to grow.
The Navy faces the most serious personnel shortages, given plans to
add two new carrier battle groups and to expand the overall fleet
beyond 600 ships. Although the Navy added 42,000 people be-
tween 1981 and 1985, this growth rate was below that required to
fully staff the growing fleet.65 In addition, shortages clearly exist in
all three major services in those skill areas most needed to staff the
62. Dep' of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 1"ear 1984: Hearings Before the Subconim. on
Defense of the Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 174 (1983) (statement
of Alice M. Rivlin, Dir., Congressional Budget Office) [hereinafter FY 1984 HEARINGS];
Congressional Budget Office, Future Budget Requirements for the 600-Ship Navy, 10-
14 (Apr. 1985) (staff working paper).
63. 1987 BUDGET ESTIMATES, supra note 17.
64. Despite the fact that overall personnel numbers remained the same, Senator
Gary Hart and defense analyst William Lind conclude that all of the services are suffer-
ing from shortages of non-commissioned officers who "are the repository of a military
service's technical expertise." G. HART & W. LIND, supra note 13, at 61.
65. See Dep't of Defense .4Inhorization for Appropriations for Fiscal 1ear 1986: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2252-59 (1985)
(statement of Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence). Vice Adm. Lawrence, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Personnel, testified that the Navy had fallen significantly below the
anticipated growth curve it would require in order to fully staff the new ships and sub-
marines entering the force. Based on Admiral Lawrence's testimony, the author calcu-
lates that Navy military manpower has fallen 20,000 people short of the anticipated
growth curve. Id.
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new equipment acquired by military units: repair technicians,
skilled operators, and engineers. 6 6
Funding for operations and maintenance has also lagged since
1981. In its debate over the FY 1984 defense budget, the House
Armed Services Committee staff warned that the services were fall-
ing far behind the anticipated O&M needs of the weapons buildup:
O&M will have to support larger forces, more installations and activi-
ties, employ a greater number of civilians, maintain a growing inven-
tory of equipment while maintaining readiness and increasing
sustainability. And there is real concern that if the O&M base proves
to be too limited to support this burden, it cannot be corrected in the
face of a growing "outlay bulge" created by the production of the in-
creasing number of weapons we have authorized over the past two
years.67
The increasing sophistication of the new systems entering the in-
ventory has also created growing needs for higher O&M spending.
In 1983, for example, then Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Di-
rector Alice Rivlin estimated that the operating and support costs
for six new Army combat systems would exceed those of the antece-
dent versions by 45 to 70 percent in constant dollars. Rivlin con-
cluded that the Army was underestimating its O&M needs.68
The O&M problem remains serious, and the DoD budget plan-
ning clearly reflects attempts to recognize the need for spending in-
creases. 69 In its FY 1987 budget request, for example, DoD
requested an $11 billion increase in the O&M account, more than
twice the average annual growth rate since 1981. Budget con-
straints, however, led Congress to reduce this amount (though less
sharply than it reduced investment programs) leaving the Pentagon
still behind on the O&M growth curve. 70
A shortage of personnel, especially those with critical skills, inade-
quately maintained forces and insufficient backup spares, repair de-
66. See M. BINKIN, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER (1986) for a de-
tailed discussion of the difficulty the services experience with maintaining adequate
skilled personnel for their sophisticated equipment.
67. See STAFF OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMm., 98Th CONG., IST SESS., FY 1984
DOD O&M REQUEST (staff briefing paper, 1983).
68. FY 1984 HEARINGS, supra note 62, at 174 (statement of Alice 1M. Rivlin, Dir..
Congressional Budget Office).
69. CONGRESSIONAl. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING TIlE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVE-
NUE OPTIONS: A REPORT TO THE SENATE ANI) HOUSE COMMITTrEES ON THE BuIDGET., part
II, at 66 (1986).
70. 1987 BUDGET ANAIYSIS, s.IIpr note 10, at 6, Table IV; OMB HISTORICAl. "III.ES.
supra note I I ; DBP ANALXI-I'AI. TABl.ES, sn/pna note 6, at Table VII. For a chronology of
congressional action regarding specific defense accounts, see generally H.R. REP. No.
718, stpra note 45; S. REP. No. 331, supra note 45.
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pots, and trained personnel does not make for a ready military. 7'
These problems are clearly worsening, and this realization has been
reflected in DoD budget planning. With current fiscal constraints,
however, it becomes increasingly difficult to meet the funding re-
quirements of ambitious procurement plans while adequately staff-
ing and maintaining the equipment now being deployed. Defense
planners will be forced to face the fiscal conflict and to choose be-
tween these requirements.
E. Summary
The investment-driven defense budgets of the first half of the dec-
ade have already created upward pressures on defense outlays over
the next five years. New problems are now added to this fiscal leg-
acy: the budgetary requirements of a new generation of weapons
programs about to enter production (among which no priorities
have been set), the unpredictable costs of these new systems, and
additional demands for personnel and operations and maintenance
spending. All of these trends are on a collision course with growing
pressures to hold down defense spending.
III. Downward Pressures on Defense Resources
After five years of unprecedented buildup, recent defense budgets
have come under severe pressure. This pressure has two sources:
the public and congressional reaction to wasteful defense spending
and the larger congressional commitment to control the federal
budget deficit. The waste and deficit issues reflect a major change in
the political atmosphere surrounding defense spending policies.
Whereas before 1985, Congress and the public dealt with defense
budgets in the context of perceived security requirements, starting
with the FY 1986 defense budget, the defense debate has been dom-
inated by the issues of waste and resource limitations.
Secretary Weinberger came into office with a strong commitment
to improving the procurement process, and initiated a series of re-
forms which promised significant change but produced limited re-
suits. 72  The Weinberger Defense Department has resisted a
71. Richard Gabriel argues, for example, that war stocks and supplies for NATO are
"less than half what the Armv. projects wartime requirements to be." R. GABRIEl.., spa
note 13, at 26. See also id., at 186.
72. Problems with tile weapons acquisition process are not new to this administra-
tion and reforms have been diflicult to implement for at least two decades. See M. PECK
& F. SCiHER R . THE WFAPONs ACQruislTION PROCESS (1962); Sims, Sploon-Feding Ihe. Mi/i-
laty: llow .Vew 1I'eapols Come to Be, in TH: PENTAGON \VATCIIERS 225-265 (L. Rodberg &
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number of congressional attempts to reform the acquisition pro-
cess. 73 Meanwhile, there have also been persistent reviews of DoD
management,74 revelations of waste and performance inadequacies
in weapons programs, 75 and a steady stream of Inspector General
and congressional reports and hearings revealing defense contrac-
tor misconduct. 76
Public support for the defense buildup, already declining, has
been further eroded by revelations of wasteful spending practices.
Gallup polling data show that in 1980, public opinion favored a
buildup: 58 percent believed that the nation spent too little on de-
fense, 25 percent believed the U.S. spent about the right amount,
and 11 percent believed that the U.S. spent too much. By 1982, a
significant shift had occurred: 41 percent believed we spent too
much on defense, 31 percent believed the U.S. spent about the right
amount, and 16 percent believed too little was being spent. ByJanu-
D. Shearer eds. 1970). In 1986, the General Accounting Office reviewed the implemen-
tation of the Carlucci initiatives and noted that "overall, most program managers ...
reported that the Acquisition Program has made little or no difference in the acquisition
process." See Capaccio, Little Impact Seen for Reforms, DEFENSE WEEK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 7.
73. These reforms included the creation of an independent Inspector General and
independent testing office in the Pentagon, a requirement for contractor warranties on
weapons systems, legislation obliging contractors to report on real costs for raw materi-
als and labor ("should cost" legislation), and constraints on defense contractor hiring of
former Defense Department employees and uniformed personnel. See G. ADAMS, P.
MURPHY & W.G. ROSENAU, CONTROLLING WEAPONS COSTS: CAN THE PENTAGON REFORMS
WORK? (1981) (discussing how large aerospace firms operate as government contrac-
tors, including their lobbying efforts, political action committees, and trade
associations).
74. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE GRACE COMMISSION'S MA-
JOR PROPOSALS FOR COST CONTROL (Feb. 1984); The President's Private Sector Survey
on Cost Control (The Grace Commission Report), Task Force Report on the Office of
Secretary of Defense, submitted July 13, 1983 (Washington, D.C.); NATIONAL MARINE
ENGINEERS' BENEFICIAL ASs'N, WASTE IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT (1985).
75. See MORE BUCKS, LESS BANG: HOW THE PENTAGON BUYS INEFFECTIVE WEAPONS,
(D. Rasor ed. 1983) COATES & KILLIAN, HEAVY LOSSES: THE DANGEROUS DECLINE OF
AMERICAN DEFENSE chs. 14, 15, &21 (1985).
76. See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Eneigy Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Allowable Cost Reform Act: Hearing on H.R.
2397 Before the Snbcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. op Armed Services, 99th Cong.,
I st Sess. (1985); Review of Allowable Costs in Overhead Submission of Defense Contracts. Joint
Hearing Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical .Materials Subcomm. and the Investigations
Subcommn. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); OFFICE OF INSPEC-
TOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OCT. 1.
1984 TO MAR. 31, 1985 (1985).
In 1985, the White House stepped in and created a panel to investigate Defense )e-
partment organization and management and to propose reforms. This commission,
chaired by former Deputy Secretary of I)efense David Packard, produced reports recona-
mending major changes in, among other things, the way DoD managed the acquisition
process. See PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEFENSE MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT (1986); PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEFENSE MGMr., A QUEST
FOR EXCEI.,ENCE: FINAL. REPORT TO THE PRESInENT (1986).
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ary 1985, the shift was more pronounced: 46 percent, too much; 36
percent, about the right amount; and 11 percent, too little.77
The most dramatic change in the context of the defense debate,
however, has been the significant and persistent growth in the fed-
eral deficit.78 In 1985, public and congressional concern about the
deficit culminated in the enactment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
As Congress considered this drastic remedy, it became clear that the
success of the effort depended, in part, on the willingness of the
bill's sponsors to include defense spending in the deficit reduction
process. The Defense Department argued that its budget, as a mat-
ter of national security, ought to be protected from the cuts man-
dated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
The final version of the bill required that defense and domestic
spending share equally in any cuts the new budget law might re-
quire. Half of any reduction in outlays required under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings process would have to be cut from defense
spending, the other half from non-defense programs. 79 Under the
new law's procedures, a fixed deficit target was set for the first time,
and the three major elements of the federal budget - defense pro-
grams, domestic programs and revenues - were each to contribute
to meeting that target. The federal budget had become a zero-sum
game.
77. The Gallup Poll, Survey No. 234 (Mar. 1985); The Gallup Report, Public Opin-
ion Trends 1950-1986 (Apr. 1986). Since early in the 1980s, moreover, there has been a
strong public perception that defense dollars are being wasted. According to Harris
surveys, since 1981 significantly more than 80% of the public have consistently agreed
with the following two statements: "There is too much waste in defense spending," and
"Too often, companies building defense weapons end up spending more than they were
budgeted for." Harris Survey, No. 59 (July 22, 1985); Business Week/Harris Poll (Mar.
1985).
78. High growth in defense spending alone has not been the source of these deficits.
Defense spending increases have been largely offset by reductions in spending for do-
mestic social programs enacted by the Administration. Interest payments on the federal
debt resulting from the growing deficit have also accumulated quickly. The largest
source of the deficit has been on the revenue side of the federal budget: the tax cut of
1981.
The Congressional Budget Office found that increases in defense spending since 1981
were the second major contributor to the FY 1985 federal deficit. According to CBO
estimates, lower revenues resulting from the 1981 tax cut contributed $111 billion to the
FY 1985 deficit while defense spending increases contributed $35 billion and higher
interest costs added $21 billion. Lower nondefense spending helped reduce the deficit
by $38 billion. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUT-
LOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1986-1990, at 153, app. D (1985). See also Wf'hat's Driing the Deficit,
HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FISCAL YEAR
1987 BUDGET, at 21-23 (1986).
79. See supra note 4 and sources cited therein for a discussion of the functioning of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as it applies to defense spending practices. See also H.R. Doc.
No. 433, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); A. MARONI & R. FOELBER, sipra note 31.
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The impact of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings on the defense budget is
clear. In FY 1986, Congress basically froze defense budget author-
ity at FY 1985 levels. Once the first round of Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings cuts went into effect in March 1986, budget authority for
defense was actually reduced from the FY 1985 level by nearly 6
percent, to $296.8 billion.8 0
The new political atmosphere, shaped by revelations of fraud and
waste and by mounting federal deficits, also affected consideration
of the FY 1987 defense budget. Secretary Weinberger attempted to
make up for the FY 1986 budget cuts by requesting $320.3 billion,
which represented, in his judgment, 3 percent growth after inflation
above the budget authority level originally provided in the congres-
sional budget resolution of August, 1985. Congress made it imme-
diately clear that this amount (which was actually 8 percent growth,
after inflation, over the post-Gramm-Rudman-Hollings levels for FY
1986) was not realistic given available resources. After considerable
negotiation, the House and Senate Budget Committees agreed on a
budget resolution providing for $292.2 billion in budget authority
for national defense, a sum scarcely covering inflation above the FY
1986 level. Action by the Appropriations Committees further re-
duced this figure, leaving final defense appropriations for FY 1987
at $290 billion, scarcely above the FY 1986 level.8 '
Congress does not appear to be willing or able to continue to pro-
vide defense resources at the rate desired by DoD budget planners.
The stage is now set for a defense budget crisis because the Penta-
gon's plans require resources far in excess of those Congress is pre-
pared to appropriate. The Defense Department, when planning the
defense budget, must begin to set priorities, change management
practices, and lower expectations if security needs are to be met in
the context of limited resources.
IV. Conclusion
The curve of resources has definitively crossed the curve of secur-
ity in defense budgeting. For the past two years, Congress has basi-
80. G. ADAMS &j. COLMAN, supra note 4, at 1-4; 1987 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note
10, at 2.
81. The FY 1987 budget resolution passed by Congress assumed that national de-
fense budget authority in each of the next three fiscal years would be $292.15 billion,
$304.1 billion, and $316.7 billion. 0MB HISTORICAL. TABI.ES, supra note 11: 1987
BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 1. 0MB projected the following for the same years:
$299.0 billion, $318.4 billion, and $338.8 billion. 0MB REVIEW, supra note 5. Calcula-
tions of inflation rates in text are based on data in DBP ANALYTICAL TABLES, supra note 6,
at 1.
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cally rejected the Defense Department's budget requests, and has
been able to make the cuts on the margins of the budget. Several
techniques have allowed Congress to make these cuts without
greatly affecting program content: using excess funds drawn from
previous inflation overestimates, stretching out major procurement
programs, trimming operations and maintenance funds, freezing
personnel levels for some of the military services and legislating
"undistributed cuts" (left up to DoD to allocate) in the investment
accounts.
Although the Defense Department has resisted these reductions,
it has not yet had to make major changes in its buildup plans. In-
stead, spending cuts have been cushioned by the large backlog and
the budgetary momentum of the early 1980s. DoD has so far
avoided making choices and setting priorities. Congressional pro-
jections of future defense budgets now significantly diverge from
those being used by the Department in its own budget planning.
While DoD budget projections for the next five years assume that
resources will grow at an average annual rate of 3 percent after infla-
tion, congressional planning is now based on the assumption that
defense resources will only grow with inflation. As a result, the Pen-
tagon's estimate of available national defense funds over the next
three years is $50 billion greater than the amount Congress antici-
pates appropriating. 8 2
These differing expectations will become evident in the debate
over the FY 1988 defense budget. DoD's budget presumes that the
fiscal pressures created by the investment-driven budget will not be
resisted and that new requirements for personnel, O&M and pro-
duction will be funded. Congress will resist these pressures, but it is
unlikely that marginal changes will suffice to bring the defense
budget within Gramm-Rudman-Hollings limitations. Pressures on
the legislature to spend are growing while resources are increasingly
constrained. The Pentagon will be faced with either across-the-
board cuts required by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or significant re-
ductions mandated by an unhappy legislature. Either solution could
do serious damage to sound planning for national security.
It is now urgent for the Defense Department to recognize re-
source limitations and to rethink the national security program in
that context. Multiple policy goals are currently being pursued
82. Defense Budget Project calculations based on data from OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF TilE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY
1988, and unpublished data collected by the Congressional Budget Office.
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through the defense budget: rapid expansion of strategic forces, ex-
tensive conventional force spending in Europe, significant growth in
the Navy, and the development of larger rapid mobility forces. DoD
needs to take a close look at these program priorities, consider them
in light of such policy options as major arms control agreements,
and scale down weapons purchase plans by identifying and focusing
on higher priority missions and systems.
DoD must also scrutinize its internal budgeting and policymaking
processes. Given the large buildup of the first half of the 1980s, it is
now time to find a proper balance between weapons programs and
adequate funds for personnel and operations and maintenance. In
particular, DoD must devote adequate attention to making informed
choices among new projects at this crucial stage in the research and
development process, before these projects enter production and
add to the upward pressure on the budget. Questions DoD should
consider include, for example: do the Air Force and the Navy each
truly require new, advanced fighter aircraft at this point in time? Do
airlift requirements make necessary an immediate decision on a new
cargo plane? Does the Army really need another light helicopter
program? Is a new attack submarine required now and, if so, is the
current candidate the best option? Such basic questions must be
asked immediately, before the next budget becomes locked in and is
then subjected to across-the-board reductions.
The Defense Department also needs to make a commitment to
careful fiscal management. The first step should be to address ma-
jor resource management issues. Do requests for continued rapid
growth in defense spending make sense when there is clear evidence
that the current managers of the Pentagon are no more able than
their predecessors to spend the resources the Pentagon has re-
ceived? Are inflation estimates in weapons costs projections accu-
rate or might they be revised? Can cost control mechanisms and
cost projections be improved so that future weapons production de-
cisions will not result in further upward pressures on spending?
Congress also must be prepared to tackle a more ambitious de-
fense agenda than it has to date. Although Congress has found it
difficult to face the problem of relating defense policy to mission
and to budget constraints, it must now begin to do so. Moreover,
Congress needs to find the will to use fiscal constraints to force the
Defense Department to face these same issues. Finally, Congress
should enhance its oversight of Pentagon budget planning and re-
Vol. 5:7, 1986
Defense Choices and Resource Constraints
source management in order to avoid the surprises of excess funds
or underestimated costs.
Fiscal constraints are creating the necessity for explicit policy
choice, improved priority-setting and sound budget management.
"Trimming the fat" no longer suffices as a defense budget strategy,
either for the Pentagon or for Congress. Unless more fundamental
questions about defense resource allocation are asked and the an-
swers found, national security needs could well be sacrificed on the
altar of deficit reduction.
